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Article 8

The Tragic Case of Jodie and Mary:
Questions about Separating
Conjoined Twins
by
Christopher Kaczor, Ph.D.
The author is affiliated with Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles,
in the Department of Philosophy

The tragic case of conjoined twins Mary and Jodie made news around the
world and sent ethicists into speculation. Born in Manchester, England on
August 8, 2000, Mary and Jodie's appearance was so unusual and their
disabilities so severe that several doctors had to excuse themselves from
giving care to the twins. Jodie and Mary were joined at the lower abdomen
and shared a spine. Though both twins had nearly a full complement of
organs, Jodie's heart and lungs maintained both of their lives since Mary's
were not sufficiently developed to pump oxygenated blood. Doctors
predicted that Jodie's circulatory system would give out in a matter of
weeks under the strain of supporting both girls.
It was a decision to rival Solomon's: Should one twin be sacrificed in
order to save the other or should both be allowed to perish? In light of
medical testimony, a British high court judge ordered that the twins be
separated against the wishes of their Catholic parents and the Catholic
archbishop of Westminster, Cormac Murphy-O'Connor, who objected to
the procedure for a variety of reasons in a tightly argued submission to the
court. On November 7, 2000, surgeons in St. Mary's Hospital, following
the judge's ruling, separated the twins and Mary died.
The case raises profound ethical and, indeed, metaphysical
questions. Obviously, not all these issues can be addressed here. I will limit
myself to these three questions:
1) Was the separation of Mary and Jodie intentional killing?
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2) Was the separation of Mary and Jodie intentional mutilation?

and
3) Was the separation of Mary and Jodie obligatory?
Answers to these questions led Murphy-O'Connor to the judgment
that the twins must not be separated. Different answers to the same
questions led Lord Justice Ward of the appeals court to the judgment that
the twins must be separated. My answers to these questions have led to the
conclusion that Jodie and Mary may be licitly separated but that there is no
obligation to separate them.

1. Was the Separation of Mary and Jodie Intentional Killing?
Some have argued that separating conjoined twins violates the
principle that human life is sacred, that it is inviolable, so that no one
should ever intend to cause an innocent person's death by act or omission.
David C. Thomasma, et al. note arguments that construe the separation of
conjoined twins as killing one to save another. "(T)he double effect
doctrine includes a strong proviso that the 'evil' effect cannot be the means
of achieving the good one, since we cannot condone an evil means to
accomplish a good end (the ends do not justify the means). Under this
principle, directly killing one twin is a bad effect and cannot be used as the
means to accomplish the good effect, a chance for the other one to live."l
However, in the case of Jodie and Mary, as with the Lakeburg twins,2
it is not the death of one twin that secures the life of the other, even though
in both cases the surgeons themselves did not seem to view the death of the
weaker twin in negative terms. Suppose that the twins were separated and
the weaker twin received donated organs that secured her life. The fact that
the weaker twin did not die would not in any way hinder (or help) the
survival of the stronger. It is not the death of the weaker twin that is the
means of survival for the stronger twin, any more than the death of the
fetus is the means of securing the life of the mother in the case of a gravid
cancerous uterus. In both cases, the death is not a means but rather is a
foreseen side effect.
However, some philosophers have argued that if a side effect is fully
foreseen or even if it is only highly likely, then it must also be included in
the means as intended. 3 This view, however, cannot be held by those who
have long treated the removal of a cancerous uterus gravid with a previable
fetus as the paradigm case of foreseeing, rather than intending an evil
effect, since in this case the death of the fetus is inevitable. Since one
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desires what one intends, this view would also lead to the implausible
conclusion that doctors desire all the harmful foreseen side effects of the
medications, surgeries, and treatments that they prescribe. 4
Thomas D. Kennedy proposes another standard for distinguishing
what is intended from what is merely foreseen. Following many authors, he
suggests that in the removal of an ectopic pregnancy the embryonic death,
though certain and fully foreseen, is nevertheless not intended. However, he
believes that the case of Mary and Jodie differs significantly. Kennedy writes:
In the case of ectopic pregnancy, the death of the fetus does
not save the life of her mother. We could imagine a removal
of the fallopian tube in which the fetus lives and the
immediate transfer of the fetus to an artificial womb in
which the baby might develop through "birth." Unlikely,
indeed, but possible. It is not unreasonable, thus, to consider
the death of the fetus an undesirable effect, rather than the
means to the mother's preservation in the removal of the
fallopian tubes. We cannot think of the removal of Mary
analogously. Mary has no functioning heart or lungs. To
surgically separate the twins is, thus, to separate Mary from
the function of vital organs. We cannot imagine a human
being living without vital organs. Thus, to aim at the
separation of Mary from her vital organs is to aim at her
death , to intend that she die so that her sister may live.s
Just as separating someone from food and water is intending to kill them,
so too, argues Kennedy, is separating someone from the function of vital
organs.
About the case of ectopic pregnancy, Kennedy is absolutely correct.
Not only is it possible to conceive of the fetus being removed and surviving
initial implantation outside the uterus, in fact there are several documented
cases of healthy children born from such a transplantation from a fallopian
tube. 7 Clearly, removing an ectopic pregnancy from a fallopian tube is not
necessarily intentional killing.
However, Kennedy seems to be mistaken that one cannot imagine a
human being living without vital organs. Unlike, say a married bachelor, or
a square circle, a human being living without vital organs is certainly a
logical possibility. Imagine a person living without vital organs through
divine intervention. In fact , one might argue that a human embryo at an
early stage of development is a living human being but lacking any vital
organs. In addition, separating someone from his or her vital organs does
not in fact always result in death. Mary, for instance, was living without her
vital organs, using instead Jodie's. Similarly, those who use kidney dialysis
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machines, iron lungs, respirators, colostomies, etc., all survive without
vital organs. Separating a person from vital organs cannot in itself be
considered killing, without casting doubt on the morallicitness of artificial
heart transplants. Finally, comparing the separated conjoined twins to the
removal of food and water from a person would seem to strengthen the
case against considering the separation as intentional killing. Kennedy
writes: "As surely as refusing me access to food and water is to aim at my
death, so surely is removing Mary from the vital organs she shares with
Jodie to aim at her death."7 However, were I to remove all food and water
from myself on a hunger strike, few would consider my actions suicidal. If
a family in grave danger of starvation were to refuse access to food and
water to a stranger, they would nevertheless not be intending the stranger's
death, even if they knew he would die. This suggests that Kennedy has not
properly distinguished intention from foresight.
The question of distinguishing intention from foresight is a vexing
one. What is included in a means to an end? What falls within intention and
what lies outside intention? This is a complex and delicate question. Let
me just propose for the sake of argument that the following characteristics
may help determine what lies within intention and is included in the
means. An effect is intended if:
1) The achievement of the effect presents a problem for the agent that
occasions deliberation.
2) The achievement of the effect constrains other intentions of the agent.
3) The agent endeavors to achieve the effect, perhaps being forced to
return to deliberation if circumstances change
and
4) The failure of the agent to realize the effect is a failure in the
agent's plan. 8
If one were to distinguish intention from foresight in the way
proposed, then the separation of conjoined twins would not be intentional
killing, even if one foresaw that one twin should die. In separating Jodie
and Mary, the achievement of Mary's death does not present a problem for
the doctors that prompts deliberation. If Mary's death were the goal, there
would be more efficient ways of achieving the lethal effect that would also
be less dangerous to Jodie. Secondly, achievement of the effect of Mary's
death does not constrain the other intentions of the doctors. They would not
hesitate to follow a given means of separating the children because it risked
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the possibility of Mary 's living. Thirdly, the doctors do not endeavor to
achieve the death of Mary nor would they "finish the job" if by some
miracle Mary survived. Finally, were Mary, per impossible, to survive, the
original plan of the doctors would have been in no way thwarted. Thus, in
separating Mary and Jodie, the death of the weaker twin is an unfortunate
side effect, but not an intended means, of saving the stronger twin.

2. Was the Separation of Mary and Jodie Intentional Mutilation?
A second question about the intervention has to do with a person's
bodily integrity, that arguably should not be invaded when the
consequences of doing so are of no benefit to that person. This is most
particularly the case if the consequences are foreseeably lethal. Some have
argued that in separating Jodie and Mary, doctors violated Mary's bodily
integrity. As William May wrote: "Thus even if Mary's death were merely
'foreseen' and 'not intended,' the invasion of her bodily integrity clearly is.
This consideration seems to me to clinch the matter ... Even if Mary 's
death were not directly intended, surgery intentionally performed on her
body, for someone else 's benefit and her harm, clearly is involved."9 In
other words, though the surgery may not have been intentional killing, it
was intentional mutilation. Clearly, to harvest one person's organs to save
another person's life would be wrong.
Here is where the metaphysical questions begin. Did Jodie and Mary
share just one human body? Did they have two human bodies? Did they
have two human bodies with a portion shared? It would seem that they do
not simply share one human body since a single human body does not have
four arms, four legs and two heads.
Even if this implausible description were adopted, "double effect"
reasoning would be in play where one act has two effects - one positive
and one negative. However, Lord Justice Ward argued that double effect
reasoning is not appropriate in this case: "I can readily see how the doctrine
works when doctors are treating one patient administering pain-killing
drugs for the sole good of relieving pain, yet appreciating the bad sideeffect that it will hasten the patient's death. I simply fail to see how it can
apply here where the side-effect to the good cure for Jodie is another
patient's, Mary 's, death, and when the treatment cannot have been
undertaken to effect any benefit for Mary." 10
Although the Lord Justice is correct that double effect has been often
used in medical ethics for cases in which the harmful and the helpful
effects are borne by the same person, the origin of double effect reasoning
came from lethal self-defense, and its consistent application for hundreds
of years in cases such as ectopic pregnancy and the gravid cancerous uterus
has often involved effects that would benefit one person but harm another.
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Thus, applying this kind of reasoning to conjoined twins is not a departure
from established uses of double effect. But more on how double effect
would apply to this situation later.
Do Jodie and Mary have two distinct human bodies? In some cases
of conjoined twins, this is clearly the case. Consider conjoined twins by
linked arms that could be easily separated. It would be fairly easy to
distinguish clearly between the twins' bodies. William May 's assumption,
and the Court's, was that Jodie and Mary fall into this category. Where
Mary 's body ends and Jodie's starts is clearly distinct and according to
May, the surgery was on Mary's side of the divide. According to a surgeon
testifying to the court, however, the division was right in the divide
between them:
Separation of the twins would necessarily involve exploration
of the internal abdominal and pelvic organs of both twins
and particularly the united bladder. It is expected however
that each twin would have all its own body structure and
organs. It is not anticipated or expected to take any structure
or organ from either twin to donate to the other ....
Interruption of the blood supply from Jodie supporting
Mary would occur at the level of the united sacrococcygeal
vertebrae. This site could be biased towards Jodie. 11
On this analysis, it would seem that no mutilation is taking place. The body
cavity of both girls is explored and then Mary 's body is separated from
Jodie's. This exploration and separation is for Jodie's sake and not Mary 's,
but the same is true in cases of organ donation.
However, a third possibility would be that Jodie and Mary had two
distinct bodies with a shared portion. One could clearly distinguish Jodie's
head from Mary 's, Jodie's arms from Mary 's arms, and yet they shared a
torso, aorta, bladder, and spinal cord. Even if one accepts the surgeon 's
description of the proposed separation, clearly there is some shared portion
where Mary 's half touches Jodie's. The surgery was performed on this
shared portion, and not merely on Mary. Would then it be permissible to
"invade" the shared portion?
Consider sisters who jointly owned some real estate where selling
the land would benefit one, but harm the other. Presumably, the sale would
go through only if both agreed to it. But let us say that the shared property
was a life preserver, and the situation was the sinking Titanic . They could
share the life preserver and both surely die. Or perhaps they would agree
that whoever has the greater chance at life should take the life preserver. It
is plausible to suggest that the more fragile sister, if she were generous or
even if she were just sensible, would let the sister with the greater chance at
164

Linacre Quarterly

life have the life preserver. Indeed, few would blame and most would pity
the stronger sister if she simply took the life preserver from the weaker in a
desperate act of self-defense. The life preserver, after all, also belonged to
the stronger sister and both weaker and stronger would soon no longer be
able to use it. Imagine, however, that the life preserver clearly belonged to
the stronger sister with the weaker sister holding on to the jointly owned
strap of the life preserver. The case for the weaker deferring to the stronger
becomes even greater. This situation is analogous to Mary and Jodie
because the heart and lungs that were preserving life belonged to Jodie,
though they did have in common a shared portion.
Even though a portion in common is shared, the question is not
simply of benefiting one person and hanning another. The real options are
benefiting one party and harming another, or harming both parties. One
might even argue with Lord Justice Brooke that Mary and Jodie both
receive some benefit from the operation insofar as each receives her
rightful bodily integrity and physical anatomy through the separation of
what nature had misjoined together. 12
Would this reasoning justify the ghastly possibility that a doctor
might remove the organs of a person with severe head trauma and implant
them in several waiting subjects? Sacrifice one person to save five others?
There are several differences between the cases. A person with severe head
injury may live for years; doctors predicted that the twins would die within
months. Arguably, they were already in the process of dying. Just as
foregoing health care resources is permissible, so too for a person in the
process of dying it would be permissible, indeed heroic, for such a person t
donate their organs though he or she foresaw (but did not intend!) that this
would hasten death. Secondly, the organs of the person with a severe head
injury indisputably "belong" to that person. The heart and lungs in question
with the conjoined twins perhaps belong to both but it is more accurate to
describe them as belonging to the stronger twin, Jodie.
Hence, the case of Mary and Jodie is more like Judith Thompson's
famous violinist who survives through using another person as a kidney
dialysis machine. Even if not a good argument for abortion, it does seem
plausible that a person would not act wrongly ending the connection with
the violinist. Finally, in the case of harvesting the organs of one person to
give to others, the person whose organs may be taken does not undermine
the well being of those who need the organs.
On the other hand, Mary posed two real threats to Jodie's well being
in addition to the strain put on Jodie's heart. In the words of Lord Justice
Brooke: "(P)ersistent hypoxia in Mary might lead to the release of
cytokines which would be capable of crossing over into Jodie's circulation.
Such cytokines are known to be damaging to the brain and might lead to
white matter damage, which in turn might lead to the development of
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irreversible cerebral palsy. Persistent hypoxia in Mary might also lead to
the generation of thromboplastins which would enter Jodie's circulation
and cause an abnormality in coagulation, causing a prolongation in clotting
time and a tendency to bleed."13 Clearly, it would be cruel and inaccurate to
portray the innocent and pitiful Mary as an "aggressor." However, allowing
blood to flow between them would indeed endanger Jodie's well being
unlike the case of taking one living person's organs to save five others.
The objection that separating Jodie and Mary is intentional
mutilation might be handled by the principle of double effect or, more
accurately since more than one principle is involved, double effect
reasoning. Developing the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on lethal selfdefense, Jean Pierre Gury offered the most influential formulation of the
conditions of double effect reasoning:
It is permitted to posit a good or indifferent cause, from
which a two-fold effect follows, one good, but the other bad,
if there is present a proportionately grave reason (causa
proportionate gravis) , the end of the agent is honest, and the
good effect follows from that [good or indifferent] cause not
from a mediating bad one. 14
The act done, exploring the body cavity and separating the twins, is
not intrinsically evil. Clearly there are many cases in which it is
permissible to separate conjoined twins in which no mutilation or invasion
of bodily integrity is present. Nor is exploring the body cavity of Mary
intrinsically evil, for in the case of organ donation the body cavity is
explored not for the good of the donor but for the good of the receiver.
The good effect is the cessation of the strain on Jodie's heart and
lungs; the bad effect is the cessation of oxygenated blood to Mary. It is not
the cessation of oxygenated blood to Mary that per se aids Jodie. If Mary's
heart and lungs had been sufficiently developed, the bad effect would not
have materialized. In fact, a surgeon involved was asked before the
operation whether Mary could be kept alive if she were immediately
hooked up to a heart and lung machine. He answered that artificial support
of Mary 's life was indeed possible. The surgeons had not considered that
option because there was "no point" in artificial support of Mary's life in
light of her gravely disabled condition, the lack of technical feasibility in
child organ transplants, and the lack of an available heart and lungs to
transplant for such a small patient. IS
Thus, in this case, the removal of the evil effect was not only a
theoretical possibility but also an actual possibility. Thus, the bad effect
was not the means to the good. Was there a serious reason for allowing the
evil effect? This is one aspect of the next difficult question:
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3. Was There an Obligation to Separate Mary and Jodie?
The classic reason that justifies allowing one person to die is saving
another. In self-defense, one may preserve innocent life even by means that
one foresees will take the attacker's life. In the case of a gravid cancerous
uterus and ectopic pregnancy, defending the life of the mother justifies
allowing the fetus to die. It would seem that efforts to save Jodie would
justify the foreseen (but not intended) lethal effect of Mary. If it is justified
to separate the twins, is it also obligatory?
An answer to this question must take into account more than just the
two lives at stake. In preserving life, one must avoid two extremes. On the
one hand, some would say that without a certain quality of life a person
should not live. But as Cormac Murphy-O'Connor wrote:
It is seriously unreasonable to seek to justify the ending of
someone's life on the grounds that that human being's life
lacks value or worth, [note omitted] so that he or she would
be better off dead. Judgments of that kind should not be
admitted as justifications of intentional killing since they are
both arbitrary and admit of no principled way of containing
their extension to a variety of other conditions, and so are
incompatible with the justice which the law should uphold.
The indispensable foundation of justice is the basic equality
in worth of every human being.16
On the other hand, a "vitalistic" ethic which promotes and preserves
human life at any and all cost without consideration of other values also
misses the mark. There is no obligation to preserve human life regardless
of the burdens on others and the one whose life is preserved. Again, in the
words of Murphy-O'Connor:
There is no duty to adopt particular therapeutic measures to
preserve life when these are likely to impose excessive burdens
and the patient and the patients' carers. Would the operation
that is involved in the separation involve such "extraordinary
means"? If so, then quite apart from its effect on Mary, there
can be no moral obligation on doctors to carry out the
operation to save Jodie, or on the parents to consent to it. 17
Like so many issues, what is to count as "ordinary" as opposed to
"extraordinary" means is itself the subject of some debate.
Let me simply propose, though I cannot here defend, a standard.
William E. May, in his article, "Criteria for Withholding or Withdrawing
Treatment," writes:
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(M)edical treatment is "extraordinary" or "disproportionate"
and hence not morally obligatory if objectively discernible
features in the treatment itself, its side-effects, and its
negative consequences impose grave burdens on the person
being treated or on others. Excessive burdensomeness is the
major criterion, therefore, for determining whether or not to
withhold or withdraw medical treatments. Excessive
burdensomeness is, one could say, the genus. Species of
excessive burdensomeness include riskiness of the
treatment, excessive pain of the treatment, the severely
negative impact the treatment will have on the subject's life,
treatments judged morally or psychologically repugnant,
and treatments that would be too costly and severely imperil
the economic security of the patient, the patient's family, or
the community. 18
In the case of conjoined twins, most of these kinds of
burdensomeness were in play. Although the surgeons said that treatment
would not be excessively risky for Jodie (they projected a 94% likelihood
of survival), it was not only risky but also certainly lethal to Mary. And
even though Jodie is alive at the moment I write, one study suggests that
there is no case in which one twin was sacrificed and the other twin
survived more than a year. 19 Although Jodie's quality of life might be
reasonably good, doctors fear that Jodie will experience incontinence,
difficulty in walking, and the need for protracted reconstructive surgery.20
The treatment was judged morally and psychologically repugnant by the
parents whose love and care for both children were not questioned but
assumed by the court. The treatment was costly and severely imperiled the
economic security of the children 's family. The father of the twins had
been unemployed for eight years ; the mother stopped working when she
found out she was pregnant. They foresaw years of expensive treatments
and disruption to their family if the twins were separated. In fact, they
predicted that they would have to place Jodie in an adoptive family living
nearer to needed medical care. According to May's standard, the separation
of Jodie and Mary was a paradigm case of extraordinary means, and there
is never a duty, even though it may be permissible, to use extraordinary
means to preserve human life.
Unfortunately, the court turned what was permissible into what was
obligatory. The court noted: "every instinct of the medical team has been to
save life where it can be saved . .. [S]incere professionals could not allay a
collective medical conscience and see children in their care die when they
know one was capable of being saved."21Since the operation could not take
place against the wishes of the parents unless ordered by the court, the
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hospital asked the court to let the doctors fulfill their vitalistic ambitions.
Unfortunately, the court obliged them.
The case of Jodie and Mary prompts many questions, and I have tried
to answer only three here. Was the separation intentional killing? Was the
separation intentional mutilation? Was the separation obligatory? The
answer to each of these questions is the result of complex considerations,
uncertain assumptions, and careful deliberations, but I believe the
deceptively simple conclusion to each question is the same: No.
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